States lawmakers and judiciary no longer have to depend on governors for funds

The Nation'sonline Editorial

THE recently signed 4th alteration bill of the 1999 constitution has enhanced the much desired independence of the legislature and judiciary in the states. The amendments entitle the two arms of government to direct funding from the consolidated revenue account, instead of depending on the state executives for their allocations. We commend President Muhammadu Buhari and the national and state assemblies for this improvement, even as we urge that ultimately, the judiciary should be federalised.

As explained by Ita Enang, the Senior Special Assistant to the President on National Assembly Matters (Senate), henceforth: “the funds due to the judiciary are now to be paid directly to the judiciary of those states, no more through the governors,” while the funds “standing in the credit of the Houses of Assembly in the states are now to be paid directly to the Houses of Assembly of the states for the benefit of the legislators and the management of the Houses of Assembly.”

We are hopeful that the new law will grant the states’ legislatures and judiciaries the ennoblement to leave up to their constitutional responsibilities. By our presidential system of government, the two arms, with the state executive, constitute the vital tripod upon which our constitutional governments rest. Where any of them is dependent on another for the oxygen to survive, what we have is akin to monarchy, instead of democracy.

This has been the lot of many states where the governors are treated by the legislature and judiciary as the Lord of the Manor; because until the new amendments, the governors held the financial power. Because the governors determine when to fund the legislatures for instance, most state assemblies act timidly when budgets are presented for passage. In many instances they lack the courage to dutifully scrutinise the proposals from the executive.

A comical example was when Governor Ayo Fayose presented the 2018 budget to the Ekiti State House of Assembly, “and passed it, after asking openly for any objection, using a gavel from his ‘kitchen’.” In several states, the leadership of the state assemblies are installed and removed when it pleases the governor, for good, bad or no reason at all. And without an independent and viral legislature, the governor is at best a monarch, and at worst, a dictator.

The consequences are flagrant abuse of power, such that many speakers of the state Houses of Assembly will do anything humanly possible to be in the good books of the governor, regardless of the disposition of his colleagues. There are instances where the house does not sit, but decisions favourable to the governor are foisted by pliant speakers, as the decision of the House. The case of dependent judiciaries in the states, is no less harmful to the wellbeing of democracy.

While the position of the judiciary in the states has been a shade better because their salaries and disciplinary control is in the hands of the National Judicial Council (NJC), their capital expenditure and recurrent expenditure come from the state budgetary allocation. A chief judge who depends on funds given by the executive to pay judicial workers, buy office equipment and stationery, pay for accommodation, maintain vehicles and the offices, among other financial demands, may be hamstrung when dealing with a matter in which the executive has interest.

But while the state judiciaries have gained their independence from the state executives, we still need an exhaustive hierarchy of courts for states and autonomous state judicial councils, if we want to federalise our judiciary. Amongst other gains, that will straighten the appointment and discipline of judges of state high courts and enhance efficiency of our legal system.